

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 212555

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TAGS: PFOR, OVIP (INGERSOLL, ROBERT S.)

SUBJECT: SPECIAL SUMMARY NUMBER 6 FOR THE DEPUTY
SECRETARY: TELEGRAPHIC SUMMARY

1. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS IN LIGHT OF EMBARGO

A REORIENTATION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY COULD HAVE
IMPORTANT RAMIFICATIONS FOR US NATIONAL INTERESTS. EMBASSY
ANKARA SPECULATES ON OPTIONS WHICH MAY BE OPEN TO THE
GOT SHOULD CONGRESS FAIL TO LIFT THE ARMS EMBARGO:

--TURKEY WILL PROBABLY STAY IN NATO DESPITE THE SOURING
OF RELATIONS WITH THE US. HOWEVER THE INABILITY OF THE
OTHER NATO MEMBERS TO STRONGLY SUPPORT TURKEY IN THE
GREECE-TURKEY DISPUTE AND TO MEET TURKEY'S ARMS
REQUIREMENTS INCREASE THE DANGER THAT TURKEY WILL TURN
TO THE NEXT ALTERNATIVE.

--FOREIGN POLICY COULD BE REDIRECTED TO A GRADUAL
DISENGAGEMENT FROM NATO, A SLOW PROCESS WHICH WOULD BE
ACCOMPANIED BY MUCH PUBLIC DEBATE. THE FINAL CUTTING

SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 212555

OF THE TIES WOULD BE AVOIDED FOR SOME TIME.

--TURKEY WILL BEGIN EXPLORING WITH GREATER INTENSITY

ITS RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND PAKISTAN WHILE IRAN, WHICH SO FAR HAS SHOWN LIMITED INTEREST IN ASSISTING TURKEY, MIGHT SHOW MORE INTEREST IF TURKEY BEGINS TO DRIFT.

--TURKEY IS LIKELY TO STEP UP ITS EXPLORATION OF BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS, YET THE ARABS WITH SERIOUS MISGIVINGS ABOUT ARMING AND BANKROLLING THEIR FORMER MASTERS AS WELL AS POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH GREECE AND THE USSR CAN BE EXPECTED TO EXTRACT A HIGH POLITICAL PRICE.

--TURKEY COULD MAKE A STRONGER EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN ITS TIES WITH THE THIRD WORLD, ALTHOUGH ANY SIGNIFICANT ADVANCE WOULD HAVE TO AWAIT THE SEVERANCE OF TURKEY'S CONNECTIONS WITH NATO.

--THE PROCESS OF SOFTENING TURKEY'S ADVERSARY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR WILL GO ON AND EVEN INTENSIFY DESPITE TURKEY'S FUNDAMENTAL DISTRUST OF THE SOVIETS; AS A LAST RESORT TURKEY COULD EVEN SEEK A POSITIVE AND CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR.

YET EVEN IF THE ARMS EMBARGO IS LIFTED, ALL WILL NOT BE WELL IN US-TURKISH RELATIONS. THE POLICY OPTIONS ABOVE WILL CONTINUE TO BE PRESENT ALTHOUGH IN NOWHERE AS IMMEDIATE AND ACCUTE A FORM. TURKEY WILL SEEK EARLY NEGOTIATIONS TO DEVELOP A REVISED DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT FROM WHICH THEY EXPECT TO SEE EMERGE A US ROLE IN TURKEY ALTERED CONSIDERABLY IN

FORM AND SOMEWHAT IN SUBSTANCE AS WELL.

2. WHY DID SADAT ACCEPT A "BAD DEAL?"

EMBASSY CAIRO NOTES THAT SADAT WAS AWARE BEFOREHAND THAT ANY AGREEMENT WOULD PRESAGE ATTACK FROM RADICAL ARAB QUARTERS. WITH THE UPROAR FAR EXCEEDING EGYPT'S FEARS, THE EMBASSY OFFERS THE FOLLOWING EXPLANATIONS FOR SADAT'S

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 212555

AGREEMENT TO A PACT WHICH FORCED EGYPT TO GIVE UP MORE AND RECEIVE LESS THAN THE GOE CONSIDERED POLITICALLY SAFE.

--FOLLOWING EIGHTEEN MONTHS WITHOUT POLITICAL MOVEMENT, SADAT FELT THIS WAS HIS LAST CHANCE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HIS SHIFT FROM DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIETS TO DEPENDENCE ON THE US IS WORKING.

--THE WAR OPTION AND THE GENEVA OPTION WERE BOTH LOSERS: EGYPT COULD NOT WIN A WAR, AND FORCING A RETURN TO GENEVA WOULD POLARIZE THE USSR AND THE ARABS AGAINST THE US

AND ISRAEL.

--AN AGREEMENT, EVEN A "BAD AGREEMENT," WOULD GIVE A PSYCHOLOGICAL LIFT TO AN EGYPTIAN PEOPLE WEARY OF WAR AND YEARNING FOR ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT.

--WHEN SADAT PERCEIVED THAT EGYPT'S MINIMAL DEMANDS WOULD BE MET, HE COULD NOT REJECT THE AGREEMENT WITHOUT REPUDIATING NOT ONLY THE US BUT ALSO THE SAUDIS WHO HAD URGED SADAT TO SIGN.

SADAT IS CONFIDENT HE CAN HANDLE ANY DOMESTIC DISSENT AND IS WORKING TO SALVAGE HIS INFLUENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD. HIS SENIOR COLLEAGUES ARE NOT SO SANGUINE.

3. USSR

A. SOVIET TRADE DEFICIT SOARS

EMBASSY MOSCOW REPORTS THAT THE COINCIDENCE OF HIGH WESTERN INDUSTRIAL PRICES, DELIVERIES ON CONTRACTS SIGNED ONE-TWO YEARS AGO, AND MASSIVE GRAIN IMPORTS HAS CAUSED AWKWARD DEFICITS FOR SOVIET PLANNERS. DEFICITS WITH ITS SEVEN LEADING TRADE PARTNERS ARE TWO BILLION DOLLARS, BUT:

--HOW MUCH HARD CURRENCY IS AVAILABLE TO COVER THE UNEXPECTED EXPENDITURES IS KNOWN ONLY TO THE TOP SOVIET LEADERSHIP.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 212555

--WITH THE WORLD PRICE OF GOLD WOBBLING, IT APPEARS THE SOVIETS ARE TURNING INCREASINGLY TO CREDITS IN JAPAN AND THE EUROCURRENCY MARKETS.

MEANWHILE, FBIS REPORTS PRAVDA HAS CRITICIZED THE IMF DECISION TO SELL PART OF ITS GOLD HOLDINGS, CALLING IT AN EXCUSE FOR DEVELOPED WESTERN COUNTRIES NOT TO ESTABLISH THE EQUITABLE AND MUTUALLY BEFICIAL RELATIONS BEING SOUGHT BY THE DEVELOPING STATES.

B. TROFIMENKO ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS

SOVIET COMMENTARY IN RECENT WEEKS HAS BEEN DEVOTED LARGELY TO CONTENTIOUS ISSUES BETWEEN US. YET THE USA INSTITUTES'S TROFIMENKO, IN AN ARTICLE CHARACTERIZED BY EMBASSY MOSCOW AS SIGNIFICANT FOR THE UNUSUAL CONFIDENCE IT PLACES IN THE STABILITY OF DETENTE, CONTENTS:

--A CERTAIN STABILITY IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS HAS

BEEN CREATED BY THE SERIES OF JOINT AGREEMENTS AND BY MEASURES IMPLEMENTING THEM SO THAT IT IS SOMETIMES DIFFICULT FOR EVENTS ACTING IN AN OPPOSING DIRECTION TO DISTURB IT.

--OBJECTIVE FACTORS NOW DICTATE THAT US-SOVIET RELATIONS BE FULLY NORMALIZED AND THAT THOUGH DIFFERENCES WILL ARISE EN ROUTE TO THIS FINAL GOAL, THEY SHOULD BE REGARDED AS TEMPORARY DISTURBANCES WHICH NEED NOT HAVE ANY LASTING EFFECT.

4. PEKING: SIHANOUK COURT-IN-EXILE PREPARES FOR EXODUS

PRINCE SIHANOUK IS EXPECTED TO LEAVE PEKING FOR PHNOM PENH THIS WEEK AND HAS REPORTEDLY URGED MOST MEMBERS OF HIS ENTOURAGE TO ALSO LEAVE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS WHILE HE IS STILL ABLE TO PROTECT THEM. HOWEVER, THE CHINESE, TAKING THE LINE THAT THEIR DEPARTURE IS AN INTERNAL AFFAIR OF THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT, HAVE NOT YET GRANTED ANY EXIT VISAS.

5. INDIA REMAINS CONCERNED ABOUT BANGLADESH COUP

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PAGE 05 STATE 212555

AN INDIAN MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICIAL NOTED THAT THE GOI HAS NOT YET MADE A FINAL ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN BANGLADESH FOLLOWING THE RECENT COUP. ALLUDING FREQUENTLY TO FANATICISM AND EXTREMISM, HE SAID THE "MAJORS" MAY STILL BE PLAYING AN IMPORTANT ROLE AND THAT THERE MAY BE UGLY PROBLEMS IF SUCH FORCES ARE ALLOWED TO RUN UNCHECKED. INDIAN CONCERNS CENTER ON:

--ANTI-HINDU REPRESSION WHICH COULD RESULT IN MILLIONS OF REFUGEES;

--THE POSSIBILITY THAT PAKISTAN WILL PLAY ON THE MUSLIM THEME FURTHER EXACERBATING THE PROBLEM;

--UNCERTAINTY OVER CHINESE INTENTIONS IN RECOGNIZING THE MOSHTAQUE GOVERNMENT AT THIS TIME.

EMBASSY COMMENT: THE HIGH DEGREE OF CONCERN OVER EVENTS IN BANGLADESH, FEAR OF AN ANTI-HINDU PROGRAM AND THE TENDENCY TO BLAME PAKISTAN FOR MEDDLING THERE ARE NO DOUBT FACTORS IN THE PRESENT FREEZE IN THE SIMLA PROCESS.

6. JAPANESE FOREIGN OFFICE VIEWS ON SOUTH ASIA

IN A WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION, JAPANESE FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS DESCRIBED JAPAN'S HOPES FOR SOUTH ASIA AS SIMILAR TO THOSE OF THE US, A DESIRE FOR STABILITY

AND PEACEFUL EVOLUTION. THE JAPANESE NOTED:

--INDIA'S PRE-JUNE 26 DEMOCRACY WAS A "SHAM" AND
INDIRA GANDHI WILL BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN HER DOMINATION
OF INDIAN POLITICS.

--THE INITIAL JUDGEMENT THAT INDIA AND THE SOVIETS
WERE THE LOSERS IN DACCA'S COUP AND CHINA AND THE
WEST THE WINNERS MAY HAVE BEEN PREMATURE SINCE THE FINAL
COMPOSITION OF THE NEW REGIME COULD CHANGE AGAIN
SIGNIFICANTLY; IN ANY CASE, PROSPECTS FOR BANGLADESH
ARE DISMAL.

SECRET
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PAGE 06 STATE 212555

THE OFFICIALS STRONGLY URGED THE US NOT TO IGNORE
SOUTH ASIA, IMPORTANT BECAUSE OF ITS HUGE POPULATION
AND STRATEGIC LOCATION, FOR REASONS RANGING FROM
INDIA'S IMPORTANCE IN THE NONALIGNED WORLD TO PROVIDING
AN ALTERNATIVE TO IRREVOCABLE ALIGNMENT WITH THE
SOVIET UNION.
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